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ABSTRACT 
 
STUDIES IN MODALITY AND COSMOLOGY 
Plenitude and Possibility in the Late  
Ancient and Arabic Traditions 
 
 
Taneli Kukkonen 
University of Helsinki, FIN 
 
The thesis consists of six separately published articles and a summary. All deal 
in some form with occurrences in late Ancient and medieval Arabic 
philosophy of what is known as the “principle of Plenitude”. Professor Arthur 
O. Lovejoy, who coined the term in his 1936 study The Great Chain of Being, 
gave to the principle the formulation that “no genuine potentiality of being 
can remain unfulfilled”. While allusive, the formulation is rather vague. The 
notion that all possibilities find actualisation can be employed in various 
different ways in different conceptual contexts. In an argument, it can serve as 
a presupposition or as a conclusion; it can be grounded in modal logic, 
metaphysical concerns, or the theological precept that God is ultimately 
liberal. Sometimes the possibility is raised only in order to be disputed. All of 
these options were explored in the debates covered in these essays. 
In the late Ancient and Arabic periods, the treatment of modal notions 
was often tied in with cosmological issues. The discussions therefore touch 
upon such subjects as for instance the need for science to make necessary 
universal judgements. Among the philosophers whose thought is assessed are 
such figures as Proclus (d. 485), John Philoponus (d. 574), Avicenna (d. 1037), 
al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111), and Averroes (d. 1198). 
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(I)  “Possible Worlds in the Tahâfut al-tahâfut: Averroes on Plenitude and 
Possibility,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38, 3 (2000), pp. 329-47. 
 
(II) “Possible Worlds in the Tahâfut al-falâsifa: Al-Ghazâlî on Creation and 
Contingency,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38, 4 (2000), pp. 479-
502. 
 
(III) “Infinite Power and Plenitude: Two Traditions on the Necessity of the 
Eternal,” in J. Inglis, ed., Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in 
Islam, Judaism and Christianity (Richmond: Curzon), pp. 183-201. 
 
(IV) “Proclus on Plenitude,” Dionysius 18 (2000), pp. 103-28. 
 
(V) “Alternatives to Alternatives: Approaches to Aristotle’s per impossibile 
Arguments,” forthcoming in Vivarium 40 (2002). 
 
(VI) “Plenitude, Possibility, and the Limits of Reason. A Medieval Arabic 
Debate on the Metaphysics of Nature,” Journal of the History of Ideas 61, 4 
(2000), pp. 539-60. 
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The formatting of the articles varies according to the conventions of the 
publications in which they appear. The spelling in some articles follows U.S. 
conventions, whereas in others it is in the UK idiom. Arabic citations in each 
case follow the transliteration standards specified by the journals and volumes 
in which they appear. All internal errors and inconsistencies remain the sole 
responsibility of the author. 
 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
In 1936, the noted intellectual historian Arthur O. Lovejoy published a 
widely-read work by the name of The Great Chain of Being. In that study, 
Lovejoy presented (a) a methodology for a future discipline and (b) a case 
study which he believed could best exemplify the programme put forward 
therein. The task of what Lovejoy called “the history of ideas” was to search 
for perennial habits of thought in our – and possibly other – civilisation(s), so-
called “unit ideas” that would have endured and perdured through the ages 
and informed our way of viewing the world, even if we ourselves were not 
always aware of the rôle they played. One of the chief examples Lovejoy used 
was that of an implicit assumption of a “principle of Plenitude” at work in 
expositions of metaphysics and cosmology throughout the Western tradition. 
Each of the six essays contained in this thesis deals in some way with the 
principle and how it fared in late Ancient and early medieval philosophy. 
Lovejoy’s formulation of the principle of Plenitude was that “no 
genuine potentiality of being can remain unfulfilled”:1 he found it first implied 
in Plato’s Timaeus, then subsequently applied in countless works in the 
Western canon. The notion is attractive, and the examples he adduces in many 
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cases persuasive. Nevertheless, Lovejoy’s study has come under criticism on 
the basis of both methodological and factual concerns. There are several 
missing links in Lovejoy’s “great chain”, and some important conceptual 
gaps.2 For instance, it has been pointed out that finding the same (or similar) 
words reiterated over and over again hardly suffices to establish that an idea is 
being passed on. The exact same formulation may serve different or even 
contrary purposes in different kinds of argumentative contexts. It may also 
attach itself to completely different conceptual presuppositions. It would 
therefore be misleading to talk about a single idea being transmitted. 
This leads to a consideration of how the history of philosophy in 
general ought to be construed. If it is thought that it is sufficient for the study 
of the history of philosophy to draw up doxographies – lists of beliefs defined 
on well-defined axes of, e.g., empiricism vs. rationalism or instrumentalism vs. 
realism –, then a “history of ideas” may seem unproblematic, and indeed a 
desirable way of doing things. If on the other hand our interest is focussed on 
the way philosophers grapple with complex sets of interrelated propositions 
and how they struggle – oftentimes, fail – to maintain consistency among their 
various conceptual commitments, then the notion of “unit ideas” seems 
suspect and may turn out to be counterproductive.  
Instead the following questions may be asked: What purpose does the 
adoption of the notion that all potentialities are realised – or, for that matter, 
its rejection – serve in a particular context? What is the wider conceptual 
framework forming the background to the assumption, and how well does 
this particular idea fit into the larger whole? Does it? In other words, what 
factors make this philosopher’s appropriation of the principle different (as 
opposed to identical) from that of the next? These are the kinds of questions 
posed with regard to the occurrence of formulations approximating Lovejoy’s, 
in the historical materials examined in these studies. 
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 On the historical front, the shortcomings in Lovejoy’s account have 
been adequately documented, even as his original achievement cannot be 
denied. Most prominently for the purposes of this study, Lovejoy failed to 
recognise the presence of something very much like a “principle of Plenitude” 
in Aristotle’s theory of time and possibility. This would have important 
consequences for the shape Aristotelian school philosophy took in both the 
late ancient and the medieval epochs. Our understanding of the history of 
medieval Latin modal theory has greatly improved in the last couple of 
decades; important inroads have also been made in establishing links between 
shifts in logical theorisation and the precepts of, e.g., natural philosophy.3 By 
comparison, our understanding of the Arabic and late Ancient periods is 
markedly more sketchy. The studies collected in this dissertation work 
represent a small contribution towards rectifying this situation.  
 
 
 
3. THE ARTICLES 
 
The first two essays in this collection take their start from a specific debate in 
Arabic cosmology, the one documented in Abû Hâmid al-Ghazâlî’s (d. 1111 
C.E.) Tahâfut al-falâsifa (“The Incoherence of the Philosophers”, first 
published 1095) and Abû al-Walîd Ibn Rushd’s (the Latin Averroës, d. 1198) 
response, the Tahâfut al-tahâfut (“The Incoherence of the Incoherence”, 1180). 
In these two works the preceding Arabic discussion can be said to come to a 
head: al-Ghazâlî so ably reproduces the Arabic Aristotelians’ largely 
Neoplatonised cosmos, and his own critique of it is so scorching, that there is 
no way left for Averroës but to seek a solution on other grounds. It is 
Averroës’ hope that a more authentic reading of Aristotle can rehabilitate the 
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Sage (al-hakîm) philosophically and reclaim the ancients’ (al-qudamâ’u) good 
name in the eyes of Islamic orthodoxy. This is done partially by reinstating a 
temporalised account of possibility and necessity, which Averroës views as 
truly Aristotelian. 
 
(I) In the first article in the series, “Possible Worlds in the Tahâfut al-
tahâfut: Averroes on Plenitude and Possibility,” I examine Averroës’ 
interpretation of what al-Ghazâlî in the Tahâfut al-falâsifa presents as the 
Islamic philosophers’ third and fourth “proofs for the world’s pre-eternity”. 
Averroës’ reading of these proofs is highly idiosyncratic; it can nonetheless be 
used to illustrate the way in which Averroës routinely assumes the 
interdependence – one could say, interchangeability – of eternity and 
necessity. In his defence of Aristotelian eternalism, Averroës explicitly utilises 
the temporal-frequency interpretation of the modal terms - an interpretation 
that was prevalent in Arabic logic for several centuries. According to this 
“statistical” or “extensional” approach, what is possible will necessarily be 
realised somewhere sometime. For some, this was even taken to define 
possibility. The approach allows for a non-circular definition of the modal 
terms, as well as affording an unproblematic way of applying logic to science. 
At the same time, the temporal-frequency approach severely curtails the use 
of, e.g., counterfactuals in scientific enquiry. (Cf. (V) below.) Serious 
theological problems also arise from the thoroughgoing conceptual 
determinism this approach entails: what never is, never could have been, and 
so even God would be unable to make things other than they are. 
 
(II) These concerns can be seen to inform al-Ghazâlî’s criticism of the 
philosophers both in the Incoherence of the Philosophers and elsewhere. “Possible 
Worlds in the Tahâfut al-falâsifa. Al-Ghazâlî on Creation and Contingency” 
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examines one aspect of this critique. The starting-point again is the passage 
concerning the philosophers’ proofs; only this time, we follow al-Ghazâlî’s 
exposition. Al-Ghazâlî’s question to the philosophers is on the face of it 
disarmingly simple. Why could not things be other than what they are? Faced 
with the necessity of a limited creation – a point al-Ghazâlî takes over from 
John Philoponus (d. 574) –, we may assume that God has chosen this world 
over several equally possible alternatives. If one is willing to adopt the basics 
of AshCarite Occasionalist metaphysics, then it becomes furthermore possible 
to propose that God fashions a new “possible world” at each moment of 
time. This makes for a substantial revision of traditional modal theory.4 But 
for all of al-Ghazâlî’s AshCarism, the influence of Abû CAlî Ibn Sînâ’s (the 
Latin Avicenna: 980-1037) modal metaphysics on his thinking on the cosmic 
order is evident; the connection allows for interesting parallels with John 
Duns Scotus’ later innovations, and links al-Ghazâlî’s work to the larger 
philosophical tradition. 
 
(III) The article “Infinite Power and Plenitude” examines the debate 
surrounding the interpretation of Aristotle’s famous “infinite power” 
argument in Physics 8.10. While the complex history of the argument has been 
expertly recounted in several studies already, no-one so far has to my 
knowledge highlighted the central rôle that modal concepts play in the debate. 
The interpretation of the argument serves to highlight a fundamental 
difference between Avicenna’s and Averroës’ modal metaphysics. Avicenna is 
famous for the notion of beings “possible in themselves, necessary through 
another.” For Avicenna, this appellation applies to every thing with the 
exception of God: all created beings are possible in themselves, necessitated 
by causal chains leading up to God. Averroës appears to have known 
Avicenna’s theory only through al-Ghazâlî’s report, and to have thought that 
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it only applies to the eternal-but-caused heavens. Seen from this point of view, 
and judging by Averroës’ rigid temporal-frequency interpretation of the 
modalities, Avicenna’s formulation would then seem virtually nonsensical. 
Things are either eternal, in which case they are necessary, or they are 
contingent, in which case they sometimes are and sometimes are not. There is 
no middle ground. 
Avicenna is operating with a different conception of contingency, 
however. For some philosophers working in the Neoplatonic tradition – 
Proclus, Simplicius and later Avicenna – the favoured interpretation of 
potency was that of a “power” (dunamis) being passed down “the great chain 
of being” as a kind of transfusion and dissipation of energy. A constant act of 
conservation is thus needed. This would indicate that Avicenna’s theory may 
have deeper roots in late Ancient metaphysics than has sometimes been 
acknowledged. 
While it is easy to establish that Averroës severely misunderstood 
Avicenna, he seems to have correctly captured the central point in John 
Philoponus’ criticism of Aristotle. The latter had suggested that if the heavens’ 
power is necessarily finite (as Physics 8.10 has it), then they would carry a 
potentiality for one day being corrupted. But then, assuming that all 
possibilities are eventually realised, there is no way for this corruption to 
forever be put off, not even by the grace of God. In other words, the 
assumption of a temporal Plenitude allows Philoponus argue for a temporally 
finite universe. Averroës counters this by successively stripping the heavens of 
any possibility of destruction and rest. This further underlines the “conceptual 
determinism” spoken of earlier. 
 
(IV) “Proclus on Plenitude” examines some of the late Ancient 
elaborations on the principle of Plenitude in more detail. The article details 
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the systematic way in which the principle is put to use by Proclus (d. 485 C.E.) 
in his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Proclus was a towering intellectual 
presence in the Academy of the latter half of the 5th century, as well as its 
chief ideologue in the sharpening conflict with Christian thought. One of the 
main points of contention between the Greek philosophers and Christian 
authors had to do with the issue of creation. Where the Christian creationists 
saw the Neoplatonist philosophers as paganistic and full of rationalist hubris, 
the philosophers took the Christian view to be crude, anthropomorphic, and 
lacking in proper gravitas. At issue at heart were two conflicting notions of 
piety. For Proclus, the principle of maximal divine generosity (cf. Timaeus 29e-
30a) was a valuable conceptual tool in arguing both for the necessary eternity 
of the universe and for a full range of creatures being created. The principle of 
plenitude was to him primarily a starting-point for a certain brand of 
systematic theology. 
 
(V) Besides the infinite power argument, another context in 
Aristotelianism in which the interconnection between eternity and necessity 
came under question was the controversy surrounding Aristotle’s purported 
arguments from impossible hypotheses. The history of this lengthy debate is 
examined in “Alternatives to Alternatives. Approaches to Aristotle’s per 
impossibile Arguments”.  
According to Aristotle, from an impossibility one can only adduce 
further impossibilities: the problem was that arguments trying to argue ad 
absurdum on the basis of this often do not function without the assumption of 
further auxiliary premises, premises that can themselves be questioned. Prime 
examples of these kinds of hypotheses were lifted from Aristotle’s 
cosmological works, where it is asked, e.g., that we imagine the heavens to 
stop or to start and to grow or to contract, etc. With the assumption that 
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“with respect to what is eternal, there is no difference between being possible 
and being” simpliciter (cf. Aristotle, Phys. 203b29-30) these states would be 
impossible in an obvious way. 
The proposed solutions accordingly attempted to circumvent this 
problem, either by denying that Aristotle’s premises contain an impossibility 
or else by distinguishing between different levels of impossibility. An 
extended survey of the debate surrounding the issue, which ranged from 
Galen through the Arabic commentators to Aquinas and Buridan, is 
interesting in that it illustrates how counterfactual possibilities were handled 
before the notion of synchronic alternatives came to be systematically applied. 
 
(VI) “Plenitude, Possibility, and the Limits of Reason. A Medieval 
Arabic Debate on the Limits of Reason,” the last essay in this collection, 
draws together several threads running through the previous articles, as well as 
introducing a couple of new ones. Most crucially, I try to delineate and make 
understandable the strong connection that Averroës – the foremost 
Aristotelian of medieval times – makes between omnitemporality and 
necessity, on the one hand, and finitude and intelligibility on the other. In this 
study, I also attempt to illustrate in tentative fashion how an understanding of 
the medieval Islamic and late ancient debates can enrich our understanding of 
current issues and points of controversy in philosophical cosmology. As it 
turns out, on the borderline where physics shades into metaphysics, similar 
conceptual commitments and presuppositions appear to have shaped the 
thinking behind both new theories and old. This lends some credence to 
Lovejoy’s original contention that we are dealing with perennial ideas here – 
albeit that what we seem to have are perennial problems, rather than any 
incontrovertible answers. 
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NOTES 
 
                                         
1 See A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1936), 52. 
2 For a methodological criticism of Lovejoy see J. Hintikka, “Gaps in the Great Chain of Being: An Exercise 
in the Methodology of the History of Ideas,” in S. Knuuttila, ed., Reforging the Great Chain of Being (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel, 1981), 1-17. 
3 See here especially S. Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1993). 
4 This is the rationale behind segueing the first two essays in this manner. Although al-Ghazâlî is 
chronologically the earlier of the two philosophers, Averroës is philosophically the more conservative; as a 
consequence, while al-Ghazâlî’s criticisms can be made understandable against the Arabic Aristotelian 
(frequential) background reiterated by Averroës, al-Ghazâlî’s innovations appear so alien to Averroës as to 
provoke only dismay. 
